marginal productivity, must not be confused with the problem of stability of the instantaneous differential equations of capital formation and growth at continuous full employment (or at any other posited level of employment). Dr Pasinetti's stability analysis seems to be related to the instantaneous rather than asymptotic state. In the context of fixed-coefficient models, such stability analysis becomes very intricate indeed. We shall not here attempt to clarify the real and formidable problems posed by such a model for theories of distribution (and/or full employment) of macroeconomic type.
Our general analysis is shown to apply even though capitalists and workers may be divided into any number of subcategories each with a different propensity to save. On this growth path the rate of interest, the capital-output and the capital-labour ratio always depend at most on but one of the various capitalists' propensities to save (the maximum one), and are completely independent of all the others.
In view of the many nice properties sketched out above which hold for an economy satisfying the saving assumptions of the present model, it is with some regret that we must confess to most serious qualms over the empirical relevance of these assumptionsnotably that relating to the existence of identifiable classes of capitalists and workers with " permanent membership "-even as rough first approximation. These qualms and the grounds on which they rest are set forth in the concluding section.
II. THE NEOCLASSICAL FORMULATION OF THE MODEL
Let total real output be produced by labour L and by total physical homogeneous capital K.1 Total K is split into two parts, KC the capital of the " capitalist " class, and K, the capital of the class which receives at least part of its income from labour.
For simplicity, the production of consumption output C and of net capital formation = dK/dt is assumed to involve the same capital-labour factor intensities; this con- wit,h d2f(k) = f "(k) <0 in consequence of " diminishing returns". We shall posit neoclassical smoothness and substitutability and perfect markets, under which conditions competition will enforce at all times equality of factor prices to factor marginal productivities,3 namely, 1 Heterogeneity of capital goods can, under certain special assumptions like those underlying surrogate capital models, be introduced without necessarily vitiating the results. 2 The assumption of constant returns to scale is essential both to Pasinetti's and our own analysis, for otherwise the concept of a golden age steady state becomes self-contradictory. If depreciation is mK, then F(K, L)+mK is the function for gross national product. 3 Of course w is the wage rate per efficiency unit if Harrod-neutral technical change is going on. As we shall see in Section 10 below, for most of our results it is not necessary that r and w be equal to the marginal product of capital and labour. The first equation says that the total saving of the capitalist class, and hence the rate of growth of their capital Kc, equals sc times their total profits. The second equation says that workers savings, and hence the rate of growth of their capital Kw, is a fraction of sw of their total income, consisting of wages W and income from their capital, rKw, or equivalently of total income less capitalists income.
Equations (1), (2) and (3), or the equations (3) alone in their final form, give us a determinate growth system in (Kc, Kw) once we are given the time profile of labour employment L(t). Now we posit the usual exponential growth of the labour force, which we equate with labour input L(t), implying L(t) = Loent (with the understanding that the natural rate of growth n could include Harrod-neutral technical change, in which case L must be given an efficiency-unit interpretation). Hence The first of these equations (6) will be recognized as Pasinetti's Theorem: on the equilibrium growth path (where K/K = KClKC = IlK,/KW = n), the rate of interest is determined by n and sc only. To this value of r* there corresponds in turn the unique capital-labour ratio k*, the unique average product of capital A(k*), and its unique reciprocal, the capital output ratio k*If(k*). Hence these ratios are also independent of sw; but still they do depend on the form of the production function F or f. Note also that all solutions of (6) depend on (n, sw, sc) only in the ratio form (se/n, sw/n).
However for the solution (6) to be economically meaningful it must satisfy the nonnegativity condition kW > 0, k_ > 0. The implication of the first inequality can be inferred from the second of the equations (6). Since the numerator of the expression on the righthand side is the difference between the average and the marginal product of capital, which is necessarily non-negative, the denominator of the fraction must be positive if kw is to be non-negative and finite or, SW <SC.
... (7) i.e. the workers' saving propensity must be smaller than that of the capitalists if Pasinetti's theorem is to hold. This same inequality is implicit in Pasinetti's inequality conditions (6) and (7). But we must hasten to add that, though (7) is necessary for Pasinetti's theorem (as we have characterized it) to apply, and though (7) is necessary for many versions of the Kaldorian theory of income distribution to yield economically meaningful results, (7) has in general nothing to do with the existence and stability of a steady-state full employment equilibrium, as we shall presently show explicitly. As for the second non-negativity condition kc > 0, we can see from ( This inequality is seen to be more stringent than (7) since the capital share ac(k) is generally less than one, and empirically very much less than one. Thus if oc(k*)-i, and sc = -, Pasinetti's theorem could not hold for sw any higher than a modest 0 05.' Inequality (8) has some correspondence to Pasinetti's (6), which says sw< y, since k in steady-state equilibrium when I/K = k/K = LIL = n, we have I/Y= nK/Y= nf-.
However, Pasinetti's simple inequality 2 is ill-defined, since outside of the steady-state equilibrium, I/ Y could take any value whatever; and even on the equilibrium growth 1 These numbers are econometrically reasonable for a mixed economy like the U.S., U.K., or Western Europe. Rather different-appearing numbers would seem to come from an argument like the following. " Suppose corporations pay out in dividends only 2 of their earnings (which constitute most of the earnings of capital) and individuals all save about one-twelfth of their disposable incomes. (Such numbers are econometrically not too unrealistic.) Then identify sC = 1-2 = 3, sW = 11 and find that we can stay in the Pasinetti regime if mcK is about one-fourth." Actually, of course, the above behaviour equations would lead to the old Kaldor model whose logical consistency is criticized by Pasinetti and defended, as a possibility in our footnote 6. So, sticking to the notion that only one saving propensity applies to the worker class regardless of type of income, we would have to reinterpret the above data as follows. If people know that along with each $2 of dividends they receive, there is saved for them $1 in ploughed-back corporate earnings and that this can with reasonable confidence be deemed to yield them equivalent (and lightly taxed!) capital gains, they will (and there is some econometric evidence that they actually do) include their share of imputed corporate income in their true income and will adjust accordingly (although perhaps not on a 100 per cent basis) their saving out of so-called disposable personal income. Hence, a pure capitalist may prudently spend 65 of his dividends and still end up saving 1 of his true imputed income. If workers are stubbornly to end up with the same sw for their share of capital income-a somewhat implausible hypothesis-they must spend 47 of their dividends to keep sw = 21L. Who will buy the stock that some people are liquidating? Anyone who fully understands the meaning of equation (3) will know the answer: the saving out of wages will be just enough in the model to match the overspending out of dividends. Repeatedly we give our reservations about the realism of the strict Pasinetti assumptions. (Warning: if one tries to oversimplify reality by forcing it into the mould of simple propensities to save of people and corporations, one should realize that a corporate propensity to save of -. reflects in real life Kuh-Meyer effects in which-to oversimplify reality again-all of corporate investment is not autonomous with corporate saving independent of it. E.g., if a corporation has a marginal-propensity-toinvest its " cash " eamings of L and a marginal-propensity-to-save of i, then in all Keynesian multiplier formulas for effective demand, the relevant marginal leakage coefficient is not 3s but rather 3-6. One gets bad realistic prediction about comparative statics of mixed capitalism if one fails to take these interconnections into account-preferably in a less crude manner than described here.) 2 After further discussion of the crucial limits on swls,, footnote 11 will return to the meaning of Pasinetti's (6). path f(k)/k is not a given of the problem but a characteristic of the solution, if any, except possibly in the very special case of fixed production coefficients, where K! Y might be identified with the technologically determined (minimum) capital coefficient. Our (8) has the merit of making explicit what must not be left ill-defined, namely that the inequality sW <oc(k*)sc must hold precisely at k = k*, the k that corresponds to r* = n/sC. In what follows by r*, k* and other starred symbols we always mean the magnitude that corresponds to the root of Pasinetti's equation f '(k) = n/se, an equation that must be distinguished from the theorems that can sometimes be related to it.
IV. LIMITS ON THE PASINETTI THEOREM
To understand a theorem you must understand its limitations. The numerical range of the parameter sw for which Pasinetti's theorem is applicable is severely limited, as indicated by (8). Let us see why, in terms of the comparative static properties of equations (6).
First consider sc positive and sw zero. Then freeze n and sC, and consider the implication of higher values of the parameter sw. For sw zero, since both (7) and (8) are satisfied, we shall have r* = n/sc and k = k* corresponding to r*. Furthermore, k* = 0 if sw = 0, and hence k*Ik* = 1. Now let workers become thrifty. At first positive sw will continue to satisfy (7) and (8) and therefore r* and k* will be unchanged. That is Pasinetti's remarkable theorem. Clearly k* has become positive, showing that k* must at first be forced down by rising SW. Thrift on the part of workers, as long as sw is sufficiently small, gives society no lasting appreciable per capita benefit; it merely causes capitalists of unchanged thriftiness to end up with less of the unchanged per capita wealth.
How does this come about dynamically? Start out in (r*, k*) equilibrium with Sw = 0. Now let sw suddenly move to a permanent positive level, though still small enough to satisfy (8). The new flow of workers' saving will transiently increase k above k*, decreasing r below r*. Even though Y begins transiently to grow faster than n so that y rises, the lower interest rate means that the capitalists' Kc grows more slowly than before, which means more slowly than n. Hence, kc initially drops below the old k* = k*. Once this is understood, it is easy to see that kc will not continue permanently to fall but will instead approach the new critical level for k* given by the next-to-the-last equation (6). It will have permanently declined to this level only when k* has permanently risen to its new appointed level as given by the proper equation of (6). (Note: there could be damped oscillation around the new equilibrium, as will be shown later.) Fig. 1 illustrates this by exhibiting the behaviour of km and kr-the values of k and kc on the golden age path to which the system tends as t-> oo-in function of sw, and for a fixed value of n and of sc. For concreteness, we have frozen sc at -and assumed o(k*) = I The dashed locus, beginning as a straight line parallel to the abscissa is the graph of k'.
Within the range of applicability of Pasinetti's theorem, i.e. sw<oc(k*)sc = 0 05, we know km is a constant k*. The behaviour of k' is shown by the declining solid curve starting at k* on the abscissa. Within the range of validity of Pasinetti's theorem we know that kc = k* and hence the equation of its locus is given by the second of equations (6), which can be conveniently rewritten as For s., = 0, k* = kV. But as s., rises k* becomes a smaller and smaller fraction (and k* becomes a growing fraction) of the unchanging k*, until for sw = 0 05 k* reduces to zero and k* = k*. Here the applicability of Pasinetti's theorem and hence of equations (6) ends. The dotted continuation of the graph of the second equation (6) into the negative quadrant is of no economic significance. Instead, as we shall presently see, the valid extension of the kj curve is the heavily-shaded horizontal axis itself. Similarly we will see that for sw> a(k*)sc, k' = kw will rise above k*, increasing monotonically with sw, as shown by the rising portion of the dashed curve labelled k**. It will be presently shown that the behaviour of k', k' and k' in this range is covered by a theorem complementary to Pasinetti's theorem, its dual. The general theorem which covers both cases will demonstrate the remarkable duality results: for sw on the left of the dividing line, k' V, Behaviour of k' and k' for fixed n (assuming o(k*) = 4; sCthe value determined by the condition that the marginal product of capital must be equal to n/s, (and hence k' is totally independent of sw). But, on the other side of the dividing line ka = k**, the value determined by the condition that the average product of capital must be equal to n/sw (and hence km is quite independent of sc). The system in its wisdom will pick out of the dual regimes the one that gives it most per capita income and capital. Dr Pasinetti has not explored this case although several passages in his paper suggest that PASINETTI PARADOX IN NEOCLASSICAL AND GENERAL MODELS 277 the system would not tend to a steady state and in fact might even be incapable of maintaining full employment.' It should be immediately apparent that, as long as the production function is well behaved, failure of (8) or even of (7) to hold cannot interfere with full employment, which is insured by conditions (2). What happens instead is that, eventually the rate of growth of capitalists' assets will become and remain smaller than the rate of growth of workers' assets and also smaller than n. This in turn means that, asymptotically, kc as well as KCIK, the capitalists' share of total wealth, will approach zero while the workers' share, KWIK will approach unity.
This conclusion may be seen in many ways, the most conclusive involving examination of the mathematical differential equations (5). The economic common sense is also very clear. For we have seen that as s, rises from zero through small positive values, k* is forced down to make room for growing k*. What happens when kc' has been forced down to zero, which (6) shows takes place at the critical limit where (8)'s inequality begins to take over?
An increase in sw beyond oc(k*)sc must inevitably result in a decline of KC/K and kc toward zero. This is seen immediately in the extreme case where sw exceeds sc, since then the workers' savings out of profits alone will grow at a faster rate than can the total of all n fk* since for k>k* we must have r<r*, kc must continue to fall indefinitely, fading toward zero. The limiting value to which k tends, say k**, can then be inferred from (5") by setting k equal to zero and disregarding the last term. We thus find that k** must satisfy k** S the condition = SW. Or, as we prefer to express it in order to bring out the duality f(k**) of our theorem to Pasinetti's, the system must approach the equilibrium kk' = k** 1 " . . . if (6) [the equivalent of our (8)] were not satisfied the system would enter a situation of chronic Keynesian unemployment. Similarly if (7) were not satisfied the system would enter a situation of chronic inflation " (p. 269). Actually all that one can say is that II Y must always be a weighted mean of the nonnegative (sc, sw) coefficients, never lying outside their range because neither factor share can be negative. To reinforce our common sense proof, suppose the system has come into the k* configuration defined by Pasinetti's f '(k*) = n/s. Fig. 1 shows it will pass out of that state when sw> x(k*)s5. Why? Because for any positive division of k* between kc and kw we shall be at the vertical level of some definite point on the descending curve of Fig. 1 . On that line kc and kw would grow in balance; but now take notice that sw has increased, moving us rightward of the curve (due eastward I); if lower sw would keep K,, growing in balance with the unchanged rate of growth of Kc, then higher sw means Kw grows faster at k* than does K, Hence, we are on our way to a new equilibrium point-the one we have calledk**, identifiable byconsideringworkers as the only(that is, as the overwhelmingly only) source of asymptotic saving. This leads to another, perhaps more sophisticated way, of understanding the two cases-Pasinetti's and its dual opposite. Consider the artificial condition where the capitalist class never gets a chance to do its Marxian " primitive accumulation ": set Kc initially zero. The resulting steady state is the familiar one of Solow et al., in which the uniform sw of the single class determines the golden age we have denoted by k**, the root of f(k**)/k** = n/sW. Now, is this special steady-state stable when we test it by bringing an iota of positive KC into existence? The answer is clearly Yes, if we are in the range of the dual theorem where (9) holds. For a little Kc will initially grow at the rate scr**. therefore r** r*. Thus s,r** <scr* = n, and K, will grow slower thanL, so that kc = KC/L will tend to vanish again, moving us back toward the initial solution. On the other hand, if we are in the Pasinetti range, sw<oc(k*)s,, then, by the same token, scr**>scr* = n and hence the initial kc will grow displacing the initial equilibrium to a new equilibrium with r = r* and hence k = k*, the Pasinetti solution. Fig. 2 illustrates the critical boundary of the Pasinetti range and of the range of the dual theorem. The heavy n/sc line intersects the marginal-product curve f '(k) at the k* abscissa. If sw is very small, the n/sw line marked 1 will intersect the average product curvef(k)/k at a k** level lower than k*. So Pasinetti's theorem will apply. Alternatively, let sw be so large as to bring the n/w line down to 3, which intersects the AP curve at k** >k*. Then workers' saving will dominate (and ultimately completely dominate) and we are in the domain of the anti-Pasinetti dual theorem. Evidently, the critical watershed is at 2, where n/sw intersects AP at the same k* level where n/sc intersects MP. The critical ratio for sw/sc is where it equals (MP/AP)*; but this last is precisely the definition of relative capital share x(k*).l (The aesthetic eye will resent our always writing (i) The rate of interest, the capital-labour and capital-output ratio and therefore also the distribution of income between wages and profits are completely independent of the capitalist propensity to save sc.
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(ii) The average-product-of-capital (and its reciprocal the capital-output ratio) are independent even of the form of the production function, depending only on the rate of growth n and the workers' saving propensity according to the formula (Y/K)** = sw/n.
(iii) The remaining ratios and the rate of interest depend on sw/n and on the form of the production function.
(iv) If Kc is ever positive, its ultimate growth rate will be less than that of the system as a whole.
1 Why did Dr Pasinetti's mathematics not warn him that his was only a fraction of the story? Well, it did. But it whispered rather than shouted. In his equation (13), p.272, he notes that the factor (I-sw Y) must not be zero if he is to be able to cancel it out and arrive at his final formulas. Who can be blamed for thinking such vanishing to be an unimportant singular case of razor's-edge width? Unfortunately, it is the content of our Dual theorem that the above expression will asymptotically vanish for all sw 2 oc(k*)sc, as will be evident if only k** counts asymptotically there. P/K= r** is still determinate, but not from the p. 272 equations. Our Dual theorem corrects the absurdities implied by an attempt to confine reality to the Pasinetti theorem's consequences. Thus, suppose the last capitalist went permanently to work for a minute a day: the careful reader of pp. 272-274 might be forgiven for concluding that economic indeterminacy would suddenly result, as he panders over the words . . . " the behavioural relation (scP,) determining the rate of profit drops out of the picture altogether and the rate of profit becomes indeterminate. ... (The parameter sw, which remains cannot determine the rate of profit!) " (p. 274). Once our Dual theorem is understood, no cataclysmic indeterminacy sets in: the determinate asymptote for P/K becomes r**= c(k**)nIsw, where k** is defined above in terms of nlsw alone. Economic intuition is vindicated.
In Dr Pasinetti's important footnote on p. 216, the differential equation sc[F(K, L)-W] = knL+Lk
is erroneous, being patently inconsistent with our (3), (5) and later (51'); an asymptotic identity was wrongly used in deriving this differential equation purporting to be valid at all times. The correct formula, which together with (3) or (5) will lead to all valid cases, is given by our equation (5".
The general formulae that cover both theorems can be stated as follows. For any variable X, let X' denote the limit which that variable approaches as t-cc. VI. STABILITY ANALYSIS Now we revert back to the neoclassical model to show that our golden-age equilibria, (k*, k*) or (0, k**), are stable in the sense that when the sjs, is appropriate for each it will in fact be approached asymptotically from all sufficiently nearby values (kc, kw). We use standard local stability analysis to prove that any small disturbance from equilibrium will be followed by an asymptotic return to it. We are unable to state a global stability theorem in the Pasinetti case because we are not able to rule out the possibility of limit cycles. If they could be ruled out, our unqualified local stability conditions would entail global stability for all positive K's.
Begin with Pasinetti's (k*, k*). Around this positive level, expand the differential equations (5) in a Taylor's series, retaining only the first-degree terms in the divergences (kC-k*, kw-k*) = (xl, x2), deriving linear differential equations for (xl, x2). For notational convenience, replace the subscripts c and w by 1 and 2, to get
. (13) where the * outside the matrix indicates that we evaluate its elements as the partial derivatives of (5) The bracketed coefficients of this polynomial are seen to be both positive, because every factor in every term is assuredly positive for sw < a(k*)sc <sc, f <0, swf ' <scf ' = n.
And the positiveness of these coefficients are the known necessary and sufficient conditions that the real parts of both A roots be negative-which does assure the local stability property. How local is local? That is never easy to specify. However, if initially (or, equivalently, ever) KC = 0, obviously it is forever zero and the motion will approach the (0, k**) asymptote. However, the slightest positive perturbation of kc will send the system away from that point so long as sw < a(k*)sc. And our analysis confirms that there exists no locally unstable equilibrium point in the positive quadrant.
Will the ultimate approach to (kg*, kw) be by means of damped oscillations or be monotonic? That depends on whether the Ai roots are complex or real. Either case is possible. Thus rewrite the characteristic polynomial in the self-defining notation 22 + [a1a2 +a312+a3a2 == 0.
Then by making the discriminant (aa2 +a3)2 -4a3a2 negative, we get damped oscillations of the focus type; and by making it positive, we get monotonic stability of the nodal type. With local stability assured, what about global stability? A phase diagram can verify that our dual equilibrium is stable no matter what non-negative values (kc, kw) are perturbed to take on initially. For now the locally stable point (k**, kc**) = (k**, 0) falls on the horizontal axis, so that for a limit cycle to surround it the variables would have to become negative, which is a contradiction. Thus, our dual-theorem equilibrium has true stability in the large.
It is remarkable that this general system has both a unique equilibrium and unconditional local stability. To emphasize this recall that a similar system in which all profits are saved at an sc rate and all wages at an sw rate can, even in the well-behaved neoclassical case, easily (for sw>sc) have multiple equilibria (of which some are unstable).'
VII. CONCEPT OF A GENERALIZED GOLDEN AGE
Ihis is perhaps the place to dispose of a terminological ambiguity. A person unsophisticated in the conventions of mathematics might be inclined at first to expect everything in a " golden age " to be growing at exactly the same percentage rate. And in the case where one of the variables, say Kc, were zero, he might be puzzled over how to interpret its KC/Kc = 0/0 rate of growth. The applied mathematician is used to singular cases, where nice distinctions must be made between things being non-negative and positive. To avoid sterile controversy over semantics, he will define a " generalized golden age " as a state which, including the standard one as a special case, goes on to include steadystate configurations in which some of the equilibrium ratios are zero.
Our dual-theorem case is an example in point. Kc, if once positive, grows forever, never approaching zero. But the ratio kcO-because L grows faster than Kc. Now consider two situations, one where KC 0 and k' 0, and two where K 2>0 and k-2-0. Although kC-+kl, the divergence between K and Kc O-+o! The mathematician, with his concepts of " relative stability " of ratios like (Kc/Kw, KC/K, KC/L) is not at all perturbed that some different extensive variables show infinitely-divergent behaviour. And actually, once the literary economist has thought the matter through, he should not be perturbed either. For the phenomenon has already been occurring unnoticed in the standard Pasinetti case and is not peculiar to the dual-theorem case.
To see this let sw<ca(k*)sc, and suppose the system starts out on the equilibrium path, with [KC(t), Kw(t), K(t)] = [KC*(t), K*(t), K*(t)] [kc*ent, k*ent, k*ent]. Now suppose that at some date to we bomb out of existence some capital, say some Kc. After to the system follows a path [Kl(t), K4(t), K4(t)] different from the equilibrium path, because of the initial disturbance K*(to)-K l(to)>0. As we know from the stability analysis, all divergences of per capita magnitudes from equilibrium must go to zero in the limit: (kl, kl)-(k*, k*). But does this "relative stability " also imply " absolute stability ", namely that j Kl(t) -K*(t)I and I K,(t)-K*(t)I tend to zero ? The answer is, not necessarily, need not approach zero, but may instead increase without bound; in fact when plotted on semi-log paper (as in Fig. 3a ) the absolute discrepancy may approach asymptotically a positively sloped straight line with a slope smaller than n, the system's natural rate of growth. In other words the discrepancy can grow exponentially, though at a rate smaller than n.1 Thus, we have already had in the Pasinetti range the same infinite divergence of absolute magnitudes that is apparent in the Dual range. Why not? When on semi-log paper one curve approaches a positive-sloped straight line asymptotically, the eye sees a vanishing divergence; but when we translate into absolute numbers the magnitudes of the divergence, it can often be shown to become infinite. The sophisticated eye knows how one must allow for the properties of exponentials and ratios. At the bottom of Fig. 3a we have plotted the absolute divergence from the equilibrium path discussed above, namely 6(t) = K*(t) -K'(t). Note that 6(t) -a straight-line growth path with slope <n. Fig. 3b shows the asymptotic behaviour in our dual ease. K" approaches the curve of total K, which ends up parallel to the growth of L. But Kc ends up with the slower growth rate scf '(k**) <n, and becomes of vanishing relative importance in the limit. Now if sw is increased a little more, the broken-lines show that K and K" end up permanently higher, with per capita product permanently higher even though ultimate growth rate is the same. The capitalists end up permanently worse off, with an ultimate growth rate that is definitely lower. [The reader can show that an increase in sc alone would, in this case of 3b, raise capitalists' ultimate growth rate but have a negligible ultimate effect on society's growth rate or per capita magnitudes. In Fig. 3a , the reader can show that an increase in sc will permanently raise the per capita ratios k* and k*, but k* can actually be lowered if the elasticity of substitution is low enough.] 2
VIII. GENERALIZATION TO MANY CAPITALIST OR WORKER CLASSES
Now that we have given a rigorous analysis of the Pasinetti and Dual theorems, we can rapidly consider various generalizations. Dr Pasinetti indicated in his paper that his theorem could be applied to a world in which " the non-capitalists might be divided into any number of sub-categories one likes " (p. (iii) In every case, the relative magnitudes of b* or b** are increasing functions of the respective sJw the workers' group with the highest saving propensity ends up with the largest capital per capita, which in the extended Pasinetti case is completely at the expense of the other groups in society.
(iv) There is a fundamental asymmetry between a worker and capitalist category. Thus, if one of two capitalists with the same sI starts out with more wealth, he " ends up" permanently ahead by a finite " per capita " amount of k*. Indeed " his " extra k* forces an equivalent reduction in the k* of his class colleagues, since the total k* of the class is unchanged and hence the kj,* of all workers is left unchanged. This last conclusion holds even in the dual case, except that of course all k* end up zero in that case. [As in our earlier Section VII discussion, the effects on absolute (Kc, Kw, K) magnitudes must be distinguished from effects on relative (kc, kw, k) magnitudes. If one member of the si capitalist class has some of " his " K' destroyed by fire, in enough time his absolute wealth will have fallen infinitely behind that of his colleagues, even though his (diminished) principal grows at the same rate as theirs and though his share of ki(oo) declines by only a finite amount. Suppose a cohort of workers lose some KJw to fire. We have seen that time washes out this effect as far as their ultimate per capita k4(oo)1Aj is concerned. But the absolute effect of the fire on their KJ(t), which is given by the b(t) divergence of kJ(t) exp (nt), can be shown by an extension of footnote 1 ic's mathematics to be capable of growing like exp (n + m)t where n+ m> 0, and m is the maximum real part of the A roots appropriate to the linear stability analysis of (18).]
The proof of all these statements comes from putting all the k terms on the left-hand side of (18) equal to zero, and then searching the resulting statical relations for relevant non-negative solutions. Stability analysis is not presented here, but would represent a straightforward extension of our earlier discussion. Dr Pasinetti has associated this case of sl = 1 with socialism on the ground that "the state as such cannot consume " (p. 277) and hence must have a propensity to save equal to unity. However, since the government uses resources to provide many kinds of current services which it could finance with its property income in lieu of taxes and since it could always distribute some of its property income by gratuitous transfers, it would seem that socialism, in the usual sense of the term as involving public ownership and management of (some or all) means of production, is neither sufficient nor necessary for the analytic result enunciated. This is of course not to deny that government policy can be an important determinant of the rate accumulation in socialist as well as mixed economies.
IX. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GOLDEN RULE AND ITS ALLEGED RELATION TO SOCIALISM
We emphasize the centuries that may be involved to stress that we are talking here and everywhere of hypothetical steady-states which will never quite be reached from other states and which may be closely approximated only after such long periods of time as to make the models' realism questionable. Of course, this is no more a point against Dr. Pasinetti than against Solow, Harrod, Joan Robinson, Meade, Samuelson-Modigliani and other golden-age mongers.
X. NEOCLASSICAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY ABANDONED
OR GENERALIZED Most of the above seem to rest on marginal productivity notions of the ClarkWicksteed-Solow-Meade type. But if one examines the basic Equations (3) and all the steps leading up to (5) and beyond,' it will be found that no direct use has been made of equation (2) 3 After we had completed this analysis, our attention was called to the valuable paper, J. E. Meade, "The Rate of Profit in a Growing Economy ", Economic Journal, 73 (1963), 665-674, which gives many of the results for the case of a Cobb-Douglas function that we had also arrived at. While we find much to admire in this paper, we think unfortunate the impression that many readers will get from Professor Meade's words " . . . the' neo-classical ' result will be true in its simplest form if s,>x(k*)s, [our notation] while the ' neo-Keynesian' will be true in its simplest form if, s,<oc(k*)s," (p. 669). If the term " neoclassical " is used as we use it, merely to indicate existence of smooth derivatives aF/aK, a2F/8K2, and competitive imputation of factor prices, then the range of validity of the Pasinetti theorem as against our Dual (and General theorems) has nothing peculiarly to do with this smooth differentiability issue-as our earlier analysis showed and as this section further illuminates. This remark of ours would seem to apply too to Dr Pasinetti's " Comments" on Meade's paper, Economic Journal, 74 (1964), 488-489; but it should be interpreted in the context of our later Section 12's discussion. If neo-Keynesian is used merely as an O.K. word for valid arithmetic identities-such as the implications of Yl Y = t/K LIL = n-we are all neo-Keynesians. Along with rejecting the notion that some particular range of the s,,/s, parameters has a neo-Keynesian as against neoclassical significance, we question the imperialistic notion that the " neo-Keynesian results hold in general " if the words " neo-Keynesian " are here interpreted to involve any or all of the following notions: I must be thought of as in some sense autonomous marginalism is a modem irrelevancy; effective demand problems are always vital; income shares alter (in the long or short run) to equilibrate full employment; causation of interest or profit determination runs from growth rates of labour and not from impatience, thirftiness, and " technical productivity ". Many of these elements enter into certain models that we often choose to analyse, but there is nothing universal about such behaviour equations.
This presupposes that more capital relative to labour means lower r, so that 0'(k)<0 even if +'(k) =# f "(k). We shall again have as watershed between the two regimes sW <oc(k*)sc Pasinetti
Sw > 0c(k*)sc Dual. (1) where L has been defined in units such that 1 L is needed to produce 1 unit of C or of I, and where kt is the minimal capital-output ratio (measured in years). In this special neoneoclassical model, capital and labour are " needed" in fixed proportion, and whichever happens to exceed this critical balance is redundant from a current technical point of view. (I.e., f'(k) = dMin (k/kt, l)/dk = l/kt for k<kt; = 0 for k>kt; and is indeterminately defined as anywhere inbetween for k kt.) Marginal productivity can certainly not determine oc(kt) because of the kinked corner that f(k) has at k = kt.
Jettisoning marginal productivity, suppose collective bargaining, the State, or KaleckiChamberlin markup always gives wages three-fourths the total product, giving the remaining one-fourth as profit or interest to owners of capital (in proportion to the quantity of capital they own). This is a fairly bizarre theory since, for all but a razor's edge of KILa kt, one or the other of K and L is quite redundant and would become a free good under any regime of ruthless competitive price flexibility. (Thus, it is here implied that, even if total K were redundant, a small private owner who lbrings into existence some further K is able to command the same r profit as existing capital. There is then a great divergence between private pecuniary return from K and " the true social return "). The constancy of relative shares sounds, in one aspect, like a pseudo Cobb-Douglas function with coefficients The above illustration, in which distribution of income was fully specified from the outset, should help to bring home clearly the basic fact that Pasinetti's theorem and our general theorem about golden age identities have nothing to do per se with any " alternative theory of income distribution ".
In general, however, there is no need to postulate constancy of shares as in the above example. Let, in a general model, the x(k) share be specified as some determinate function of factor proportions k = KIL, say c(k). Then r = x(k)F(k, 1)/k = 0(k) gives the profit rate.
Recall that one of Kalecki's two theories about profits makes c(k) depend on the " average degree of monopoly or imperfection of competition " in the economy. Subject to the above stipulations, this is an admissable determinant of our r = +(k) function. Or consider a theory of the " just wage ". On Thilnen's gravestone was the formula for the " natural wage ", which Specifically, assume s1/s, small, and consider f'(k*) = r* = n/s,. Then, in our model, marginal productivity does " determine " the profit or interest rate at every instant of time, but that doesn't deny that n/se also does " determine " the interest rate in the long run. Both blades of the long-run scissors count. When we have two long-run unknowns-k* and r*-the presence of two independent equations is not an inconsistency; it is a necessity. Because the long-run " supply curve " is given by the horizontal level n/s,, while the long-run demand curve is the varying function f '(k*), there is a genuine sense of longrun causation, which we share and also neoclassical writers share with Cambridge writers (like Kahn quoted below), that says: n/sc-+long-run r*.
in our notation becomes [f(k)OF/LjL] = T(k). Hence, (Y-LT)/K = [f(k)-T(k)]/k will serve to define our 0(k).1 XI. A FURTHER NOTE ON FIXED COEFFICIENTS AND KALDORIAN DISTRIBUTION THEORIES In the last section we have shown that, even if one discards competitive theory involving smooth neoclassical production functions, any model in which the profit rate r is a declining 1 It will conduce toward stability if f'(k)<O in the diminishing retums case. If f '(k)-+~(k) = h(k) our differential equation (5) must everywhere have f '(k) replaced by f '(k)--h(k). This introduces into the stability matrixes (14) and (16), and into the coefficients of their characteristic polynomial, terms proportional to the factors h(k) and h'(k) = f "(k)-+b'(k)
But all of the above is quite consistent with short-run causation that runs in quite the opposite direction. In each short run, let k(t) = K/L be given by past history. This provides us with a vertical short-run supply schedule, which intersects the f'(k) schedule of demand. In the short run, for the model of (1) [r*, r*, ...1 where r* = n/sc; but still the general causality in each short run is from capital-good supply and demand conditions to the level and spread of profits; and in the longest run r* is achieved only because the system has brought into being through capital-goods changes, and has kept into being through replacement and capital widening, the needed plentitude and As the present section shows, if f(k) is characterized by fixed-coefficients, marginal productivity is undefined at kt and there is both room for and need for a short-run alternative theory of distribution.
-(4), the " true " causation seen, in every instant of time, k(t)-+f'[k(t)] = r(t). For this model, capital scarcity relative to labour is the key to the level of the rate of interest. Given the saving-investment propensities of (3), it is deduced that positive [r(t)-
Suppose now that many, but only a finite number of, alternative pages of mechanized blue prints are possible. If the alternatives are many and varied, putting r* in different narrow intervals will cause the processes used to be different (and will usually involve differences in the calculated aggregate ratio of the value of capital to output). Any particular short-run r can prevail only if the proper plentitude and scarcity of diverse physical capital goods is available per capita. Given reasonable, but not perfect foresight, section's (1)', in which kt represents the minimum capital-output ratio, beyond which output expands not at all and k is technically redundant and before which labour is technically redundant. When output per capita is given by y = Min (klkt, 1), the capitaloutput ratio equals kt for k < kt and equals k itself for k > kt.
The Kaldorian analysis concentrates on the case where k is at kt, neither factor being technically redundant. It does not seem to tell us what r = 0(k) is away from kt, and hence we must work out the conditions under which the system could stay at kt.
As both Kaldor and Pasinetti explicitly insist, the theory has a need to stipulate the inequality inequality <nkt <s,.
... (25) We shall now deduce this condition as a requirement for the system's being capable of staying at KIL = k = kt. Our treatment is different in deducing (25) from dynamic stability analysis of the differential equation of growth; but more important, it differs in that Kaldorians seem to think (25) must hold lest some factor share become negative or lest some regime of inflation or of unemployment become chronic. For us (25) must hold only if the system is to be capable of staying at kt; if (25) is violated, the system merely moves, in the manner already studied in section X and analyzed in more detail in the Appendix, toward k = 0 or toward technically redundant k>kt.
investors will start new physical capital goods and abandon old ones at a rate determined by the over-all (sw, s,) ratios and the inherited composition of physical capital goods. The result can be an approach toward a new golden age, with (the vector of) " capital scarcity and plenty " thought of as determining at each time the steadily evolving profile of own rates of interest, with no great surprises occurring but with some people experiencing good luck and some bad, and with most prudently remaking their plans as new experience warrants. In moving from a higher to a lower interest rate, any new golden age we come to is assuredly characterized by definitely higher real wages. And the lower interest rate does reflect a lower trade-off between consumption today and consumption next year. (Or, more precisely, one gets not more than 1+ r of next-period C for sacrifice of each current C; and one gives up not less than 1 +r of nextperiod C to get one more current C; the more varied and-numerous the pattern of alternative blueprints, the more these inequalities narrow down toward the Fisher equality I aC,+1/8C, I = 1+r.) Because multiplicity of equilibria is possible, and " Wicksell effects " of market revaluation of capital can take place in any direction, one cannot be sure that a lower r' always corresponds to a higher ratio of the value of capital to putput or even to a higher plateau of maintainable total consumption for a fixed population; in possible, so-called perverse cases, society might move from a high to a low interest rate state without having to abstain from current consumption goods, instead actually being splashed with a transient increase in consumption. Empirically, one expects the blueprints of technology to be such that at a lower interest rate, not only are wages higher because of less discounting of gross productivities, but also because the size of the social pie has gone up, and along with it the size of labour's undiscounted "productivity "; but exceptions to this are logically possible. Given the above version of a useful pragmatic model, let us examine the Cambridge view expressed well by R. F. Kahn (op. cit.). He says: " Thrift is important, however, because it determines the real wage-rate in a Golden Age" (p. 151). We would say, " In our model certainly, and in most realistic models we suspect with great probability, past abstention from consumption was necessary to build up the stock of capital goods approriate to the high-real-wage-rate Golden Age; and continued abstention from utilizing resources for additional consumption goods is needed to replace and maintain the per capita supply of capital goods of that Golden Age. In our model, with interest low, real wages are two ways higher: output f(k) is higher and, for each same level of k, less r means a lower subtraction of profit from f(k) to get w; and, of course, the effects of KIL on absolute and relative profit shares depend on the (generalized) ordinary elasticity and on the (generalized) elasticity of substitution for k." Kahn says (p. 153): "If two different Golden Ages are compared, with the same saving coefficients but different rates of growth, the higher rate of growth is associated with the higher rate of profit. This higher rate of profit is to be attributed to the higher rate of growth of capital rather than the other way around." We say: " The unobjectionable first sentence does not logically (or empirically) imply the second. In our model the higher rate of profit persists in the higher-rate-of-growth regime because the stipulated limited thrift will, when L grows so fast, provide capital formation that will preserve only a low and scarce KIL ratio (or per capita vector of heterogeneous capital goods); and the resulting capital scarcity " explains " the high r. This is true not only in the simple model (1)-(4), but also in many models with tens-of-thousands of heterogeneous physical capital goods and technologies and with a large number of alternative blueprints. (Again, there are exceptions. And if Kahn and we drop the assumption that s,w is small, we can for some such exceptional cases find that a rise in the rate of population growth ends us up, for a long time or even permanently, with a lower rather than higher interest rate. This odd effect is inconsistent with simple neoclassical parables but not with the general market conditions of neo-neoclassical models.) The cited Champernowne article, precisely because it is mathematical, shows that some of what is considered different about Cambridge or macroeconomic theories of distribution is compatible with complete models of general-equilibrium pricing that we would espouse.
Begin by supposing sW > nkt. There are two cases of this: sW > sC or s,, <s,. In the first, we know from previous discussion that our Dual analysis must hold and necessarily kc-?O with kw-+k. With capitalists' saving being ignorable, the familiar Harrod-DomarSolow formula for a golden-age becomes applicable, namely s/n = (k/y), where s and sW are now the same. Since sw/f n>kt by hypothesis, the equilibrium capital-output ratio must obviously end up at k>kt. So kt is not viable.
In the second case, we have sc _ sw>nkt, and the ultimate saving ratio s, averaged over both classes, must satisfy: s>nkt, and (k/y) = s/ln>kt must be the equilibrium capital-output ratio. Again kl is not viable. To complete our derivation of (25) (25) is satisfied kt will not be viable. Regardless of the distribution of income a, either saving will be insufficient to widen capital in balance with L growth, or it will be so great as to deepen capital beyond the knife-edge kt. If (25) is satisfied, there is still no guarantee that kt will be maintained and certainly no guarantee that from k # kt the system will move in a stable way to k-kt.
If (25) is satisfied and if we start the system with values of kc and k" that add up to kt (and if, as will be soon discussed below, kc is not too small), there will exist one distribution of income at and concomitant rt-call it the Kaldor-Pasinetti one-which will make k = 0 and hence maintain k momentarily at kt. While k remains at kt, its composition between kC and kW will generally be changed at the next moment; but if at is always kept adjusted to the resulting (kt, kt = kt-kt) so as to keep k 0, we shall prove that at a", a unique Cambridge distribution of income for which (kc, kw, k) = (0, 0, 0) and at which rt-r-t = nl/sc in good Pasinetti fashion. Just why any actual economic system should go to kt, and more importantly, being there should neatly settle into the (ct, rt) configuration is a topic that appears not to have been adequately discussed in the Kaldorian literature. And it is not discussed here. We merely state the conditions for the existence of at and prove the asymptotic stability of ott if at somehow is made always to prevail. In a competitive fixed-coefficient model, a relation like f '(k*) -n/sc or R(k*) = n/se is lacking to permit us to solve for k* and all the equilibrium values of the system. Formally, the missing equation k = R'I(n/sc) is provided by setting long-run k* = kt, the minimum technical capital-output (and, with our convention of setting A = 1 in Min (Klkt, L/A), kt is also the capital-labour ratio at full capacity).
We shall not here explore the possibility of a lagged-adjustment mechanism of Xck to its competitive f '(k) level when k = kt and to its a: serendipity level as defined earlier when k = kt. Call these norms k = N(kc, k.). Then (Xk = P[N(kc, kW) A smooth neoclassical model, with low elasticity of substitution near kt, yields marginal-productivity distribution of income that mimics the Cambridge behaviour equations-as e.g. that a rise in capitalists' consumption propensities soon leads to a permanent rise in their profit share. Hence, such theories are not necessarily " alternatives " to neoclassical theories, even if their empirical presuppositions are realistic. model. But no one yet seems to have been able to provide a mechanism from which one can deduce a determinate theory of distribution at this critical configuration. If, however, it is arbitrarily postulated that the distribution of income there will somehow become precisely such as to keep total capital growing in balance with labour, we have proved the stability of the asymptotic Pasinetti state with its unique distribution of income.
Our analysis confirms the beautiful asymptotic theorem of Dr Pasinetti for a limited range where swls, is small enough. And it provides a completely symmetrical Dual theorem -where average-product-of-capital = nlsw replaces his net-yield-of-capital = n/sc, etc.-for the (empirically quite interesting) range where sw/s, is greater than (k*), profits' share in national income. We have demonstrated that the applicability of either of these regimes depends on sw 2c sc (where oc is the golden-age share of profits, by whatever theory determined), a criterion that has nought 3 to do with the issue of whether smooth neo-1 The qualification concerning a Pasinetti limit cycle of Section 6 is in order here. 2 When r does not, for some K/L, run the full gamut from infinity to zero, the Appendix shows that the only asymptotic states may involve k-O, or r->minimum r with k perhaps going to infinity. These "pathological states" are shown to be also stable.
3 Recall, though, last section's demonstration that the Kaldorian distribution theory does presuppose the restriction s,<nkt<s,, which afortiori puts us in the Pasinetti regime sw<a'Sc -Sc. Many realistic complications ought to be added to our analysis: the introduction of uncertainty, for example, and of heterogeneous capital-goods activities of the modern programming or Sraffa type. Some of these complications are quite easily handled by modern methods. Some offer intrinsic difficulties.
But quite aside from such modification of the model, we feel it necessary to conclude with a warning about the extremely unrealistic nature of some of our crucial assumptions. Our warning is not merely directed against oversimplifications, like exponential growth of the equivalent labour force, that are unlikely to be literally true. With a grain of salt, we cheerfully make such heroic abstractions as a first approximation-making sure to determine later whether the results depend critically upon the exactitude of the abstract axioms.
We are much more uneasy with the assumption of " permanent " classes of pureprofit and mixed-income receivers with given and unchanging saving propensities on which all of our theorems-Pasinetti's as well as ours-depend critically. This assumption completely disregards the life cycle and its effect on saving and working behaviour. In the first place with a large portion of saving known to occur in some phases of the life cycle in order to finance dissaving in other phases, it is unrealistic to posit values for (sO, sW) which are independent of n.2 This shortcoming is probably not too serious and could be handled without changing our results drastically.
But the assumptions of permanent classes of income receivers raise much more serious questions. Even if we wave aside the difficulty of identifying a class whose sole source of income is income from capital, there is no reason to suppose that a person who belongs to that class at some point of his life must have always belonged to it and will continue to do so indefinitely. In a modern industrial society the capitalist's class is not a hereditary caste: its membership at any point of time is far from limited to people who were born into it by virtue of inherited wealth. This becomes especially clear when we recall that by our definition, the capitalist class would include retired households living off their capital. But even the assumption that class membership and saving propensity do not change during one person's lifetime is not enough for our purposes. Since people do not live forever, one would have to extend the asumption to one's heirs, and their heirs, and so on, until Kingdom-come-both before golden ages are reached and forever afterwards. The fact that for a sufficiently high rate of Harrod neutral technical change n", the > sign would hold in the above condition, may help to make logical sense of the Marxian foreboding of a progressive immiseration of the working class due to technical change rather than due to Malthusian biology. It should be noted that, in the case under consideration, so-called Harrod neutral technical change is actually labour saving in the Hicksian sense. It is a general truth that Harrod neutral technical change is Hicksian labour saving if the elasticity of substitution is less than one, and this elasticity is assuredly less than one in the neighbourhood where the average and the marginal product of capital approach a common finite intercept. Note also that what would be needed to help cure this Marxian kind of poverty-should it ever come about-is more rather than less effective thrift! The possibility that KIL goes to infinity can now be analyzed. Suppose n = 0 and Min (sw, sc)>0. Then it is obvious that positive saving and investment will go on indefinitely, and that K and k will grow indefinitely. Diminishing returns implies that the interest rate will go to its minimum rM. This all holds as much for small positive n as for zero n. With ox(oo) = 1 necessarily, ratio k,/ko-+O whenever sC > s, as is shown by the above formulas or by the general formula of the previous paragraph.
Whereas this v. Neumann case may be empirically uninteresting, it duplicates the complexity of the possible case of population decline, where n<O. Here again k-+oo, whenever algebraic n <rM.
We have not given the detailed, but straightforward, stability analysis underlying the many assertions of this technical section. A pathological example that embodies the branch 1 and the v. Neumann case, is given by F(K, L) = FK+ wL. Here the fate of capitalists is independent of labour, r(t) _ r, and K(t) -K(to) exp (Ts)t: for n/sc <r, k->coo; for n/sc = r, kc stays at its initial value. If s,>>sc, Kc/K,-+O. In every case, K itself grows at the fastest of the rates (n, scr' swr), so that k-is impossible. If s, <nr <sc, K,/KC-+O, in agreement with (6)'s last equation because then a(oo) = 1.
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